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I
INTRODUCTION

The application of American law to litigation with international elements
has provoked a storm of controversy. The debate is most pronounced in the
field of antitrust law, although similar issues are present in areas such as
securities regulation. As the United States faces not only increasing irritation
on the part of certain foreign trading partners, but also occasional retaliatory
legislation by foreign governments, it is natural to wonder how the present
state of affairs came about.
Some of the causes of this controversy, and thus some of the cures as well,
are methodological. This article focuses upon the interesting pattern of
similarities and differences between the problems of the application of
American law to international disputes and the problems of domestic "conflict
of laws." As the domestic counterpart of the international law issue of the
extraterritorial application of American law, conflict of laws offers insights and
analogies which, surprisingly, have been rarely exploited or explored.'
Conflict of laws has methodological problems, and experience in that field
reinforces
the conclusion
that international
law also should be
methodologically addressed. 2 Yet conflict of laws is also methodologically
distinct in interesting ways, and some of these distinctions suggest avenues of
approach to comparable problems in international law. In particular,
fourteenth amendment due process claims have figured prominently in
domestic conflicts litigation, but are virtually irrelevant to international
conflicts litigation.
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1. There are some prominent exceptions. See Lowenfeld, Public Law in the International.Arena:
Conflict of Laws, InternationalLaw, and Some Suggestions for Their Interaction, 163 RECUEIL DES COURs 315
(1979); Maier, Extraterritorialjurisdiction at a Crossroads: An Intersection Between Public and Private
International Law, 76 AM. J. INT'L L. 280 (1982); Meesen, International Law Limitations on State
jurisdiction, in EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF LAWS AND RESPONSES THERETO (C. Olmstead ed.
1984).
2. For this author's analysis of the methodological problems with domestic conflicts law, see
Brilmayer, Governmental Interest Analysis: A House Without Foundations, 46 OHIO ST. L.J. 459 (1985).
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Because of the importance of this comparison to any analysis, a brief
digression is necessary to delimit the respective domains of domestic choice
of law and the extraterritorial application of American law. It is striking that
there are two different Restatements that deal with these problems: the
Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law 3 and the Restatement
(Second) of Conflict of Laws. 4 While the two Restatements seem to deal with
similar problems, they virtually ignore each other's existence. 5 It might
appear that, given their respective titles, the Restatement of Conflicts governs
conflicts of laws among the states, while the Restatement of Foreign Relations
Law governs conflicts of laws between the United States and a foreign nation.
This is not correct. Many domestic conflict of laws cases have an international
flavor because they involve conflicts with the laws of another nation. 6
Another possible explanation for the lack of commonality between the
Restatements is that domestic conflicts law is municipal law, as opposed to the
limits that are placed on municipal law by external sources of law such as
international law. Thus, a distinction can be drawn between what a state
wishes to do in terms of applying its law to disputes involving foreign elements,
and what a state is entitled to do. 7 While this is an important distinction, it is
not the one at issue here. The Restatement of Conflicts addresses, among
other things, the constitutional limits on choice of law, which are externally
imposed rules and not municipal law. 8 Conversely, the Restatement of
Foreign Relations Law seems to indicate that its dictates of international law
are American in origin. 9 Similarly unhelpful is the suggestion that the
Restatement of Foreign Relations Law deals with conflicts of "regulatory" or
public law while the Restatement of Conflicts deals with private law.' 0
Whether or not that distinction is viable, it does not describe the different
roles of the two Restatements. Some private law cases, such as Lauritzen v.
Larsen, II fall under the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law.
The real difference between the two Restatements can be found in the
source of the domestic law and not in the source of the law with which it
conflicts. The Restatement of Foreign Relations Law deals with conflicts
3.

(1965) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW].
(1971) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICTS].
5. This point is noted in Maier, supra note 1, at 285-86.
6. See, e.g., Homes Ins. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930); Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191
N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S. 2d 743 (1963); Auten v. Auten, 308 N.Y. 155, 124 N.E.2d 99 (1954).
7. Dr. Meesen appears to be making essentially this distinction in a recent article. See Meesen,
supra note 1, at 38 (distinguishing between international law and domestic conflict of laws, decided
under the lexfori). His purpose for making the distinction is not the differentiation between the two
Restatements.
8. They are external, that is, to the source of the substantive law; federal law imposes
constraints on state law.
9. See RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, supra note 3, § 131.
10. See, e.g., Lowenfeld, supra note 1, at 323-29. Lowenfeld argues that private law conflicts
methods can usefully be brought to bear on public law cases. By private law, he seems to mean
domestic conflicts law (such as that contained in the Restatement of Conflicts) while by public law he
seems to mean cases governed by the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law.
11. 345 U.S. 571 (1953). This case was mentioned, for example, in the RESTATEMENT OF
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, supra note 3, § 403 reporter's note 2.

4.
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between United States federal law and the law of another jurisdiction; the
Restatement of Conflicts deals with conflicts between state law and the law of
another jurisdiction, either another state or a foreign nation. This
explanation suggests why the public/private law distinction might have been
offered to differentiate between the two documents. Both the federal/state
and public/private law distinctions can result in a case being dismissed once it
is determined that local law will not apply, although for different reasons.
Since states typically do not enforce the penal, tax, or regulatory rules of
other states, 12 the public/private distinction would explain the otherwise
puzzling fact that in those cases where the Restatement of Foreign Relations
Law (but not the Restatement of Conflicts) applies, lack of legislative
jurisdiction entails lack of subject matter jurisdiction.' 3 The same
consequence follows from the federal/state distinction between the two
Restatements. In a case brought in federal court, adjudicative jurisdiction will
typically depend upon whether there is a federal question, which in turn
depends on whether there is local legislative jurisdiction. If foreign law
governs, the case must be dismissed.
This explanation of the respective roles of the two Restatements raises a
number of interesting points about the proper role of state and federal law. It
underscores, for instance, that the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law
restates choice of law principles that are themselves rules of federal law, while
the Restatement of Conflicts addresses primarily state law. 14 This is not
shocking, although it could perhaps be argued either that both types of
conflicts issues should be dealt with as questions of state law 15 or that both
should be questions of federal law. 16 The importance of the federal law/state
law dichotomy will be addressed again briefly in one of the final sections of
this article.17
At this point, the similarities between the two types of conflicts issues are
more important. Regardless of whether the source of domestic substantive
law is state or federal, choice of law issues remain methodologically distinct in
at least two respects. First, choice of law typically involves the interpretation
of policies and interests underlying a statute that does not address the choice
12. This phenomenon is noted critically in Lowenfeld, supra note 1, at 322-26, 346, 353, 359
(noting the "public law taboo" and criticizing the phrasing in terms of subject matter jurisdiction).
13. See generally L. BRILMAYER, AN INTRODUCTION TO JURISDICTION IN THE AMERICAN FEDERAL
SYSTEM (1986).

14. There are some federal principles subsumed under domestic conflicts of law, namely those
based on the federal constitution or on federal statutes such as the full faith and credit implementing
acts, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1738, 1738A (1982). That the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law is based on
federal law is noted in its introduction. RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, supra note 3, § 2,

at 5.
15. The argument would be based upon the Rules of Decision Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1982).
16. The argument would be based, in international cases, upon the prevention of state
interference with foreign affairs. See, e.g., Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968); Hines v.
Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941). Cf also Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Ct., 55 U.S.L.W. 4197,
4200 (1987). In the interstate context, it can also be argued that federal law should govern. See
generally Baxter, Choice of Law and the Federal System, 16 STAN. L. REX'. 1 (1963). But see Dav &
Zimmerman, Inc. v. Challoner, 423 U.S. 3 (1975).
17. See infra text accompanying notes 118-120.
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of law issue. This is referred to below as the "silent statute" problem. Few
substantive rules are accompanied by choice of law provisions; rather, the
court charged with applying the rule must formulate choice of law standards.
Second, the competing claims are based on the laws of another jurisdiction
rather than another rule or principle from the same jurisdiction. This
problem can be termed the "narrow nationalism" problem because it poses
the question of whether other jurisdictions' interests ought to be taken into
account, or only the interests of the forum. The argument presented here is
that these two features of choice of law problems combine to pose an
exceptionally severe test of the judicial function. They explain, first, a
methodological trap that has ensnared courts operating in both contexts.
Second, they account for some of the reasons that the Constitution has played
a prominent role in one context but not the other.
II
THE APPLICATION OF AMERICAN LAW:

A

METHODOLOGICAL

OVERVIEW

The precise contours of American law in the international arena vary a
great deal from one setting to another. The rules governing the
extraterritorial application of the Fair Labor Standards Act seemingly bear
little resemblance to those governing the antitrust acts or the Jones Act.
Nevertheless, all share a common method; the relevant considerations are the
same, as are their relative importance.
Legislative Intent.- The first is the intent of Congress. The special
relevance of congressional intent is established by such classic decisions as
Alcoa 18 and Lauritzen v. Larsen, 19 but is also uniformly reiterated wherever the
issue is discussed. 2 0 The explanation usually given is that American courts
have an overriding obligation to further the legislative mandate. 2 1
18. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir. 1945).
19. Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 578-79 (1953).
20. Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 282-83, 285-86, 290 (1952); Fley Bros. v. Filardo,
336 U.S. 281, 284-85 (1949); Vermilya-Brown Co. v. Connell, 335 U.S. 377, 382-83, 389-90 (1948);
Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 437 (1932); United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 97
(1922); Tamari v. Bache & Co., 730 F.2d 1103, 1106-07 (7th Cir. 1984); Commodity Futures Trading
Comm'n v. Nahas, 738 F.2d 487, 495 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549
F.2d 597, 609 (1976); Leasco Data Processing Equipment Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1334 (2d
Cir. 1972); United States v. Firestone Tire & Rubber, 518 F. Supp. 1021, 1032 (N.D. Ohio 1981);
Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 494 F. Supp. 1161, 1180 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
21. Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 285-86 (1952) ("The United States is not barred
by any rule of international law . . . there is no question of international law, but solely of the
purport of the municipal law which establishes the duty of the citizen in relation to his own
government" (quoting Skiriotes v. Florida, 383 U.S. 69, 73 (1941)); Commodity Futures Trading
Comm'n v. Nahas, 738 F.2d 487, 495 (D.C. Cir. 1984) ("Federal courts must give effect to a valid,
unambiguous congressional mandate, even if such effect would conflict with another nation's laws or
violate international law."); United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir. 1945)
("[W]e are concerned only with whether Congress chose to attach liability to the conduct outside the
United States of persons not in allegiance to it. That being so, the only question open is whether
Congress intended to impose liability, and whether our own Constitution permitted it to do so; as a
court of the United States, we cannot look beyond our own law.").
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Presumptions: The second relevant consideration is the presumed reach of
the statute in question. In certain statutes, Congress has specified the proper
extraterritorial reach. 2 2 More commonly, however, it has not. In the resulting
exercise in statutory construction, courts often find little guidance in the
legislative history about the extent to which the statute was designed to apply
to transnational disputes. Facing this vacuum in the legislative history, courts
have typically responded with presumptions about the likely territorial reach.
For instance, some courts have held that legislation is presumed to apply only
23
to events occurring within United States territory.
International Law: The third relevant consideration is the presumed
consistency of legislation with international law. Wherever possible,
legislation is presumed to be consistent with international law. 24 The
Restatement of Foreign Relations Law has incorporated this maxim,25 in
effect giving principles of international law the status of a presumed legislative
intent.
Judicial Discretionary Doctrines. The fourth relevant consideration is the
existence of judicial discretionary doctrines, of which there are two types,
both controversial. One type pertains to the question of legislative
22. See, e.g., Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 213(f) (1982) ("The provisions of
sections 206, 207, 211 and 212 of this title shall not apply with respect to any employee whose
services during the workweek are performed in a workplace within a foreign country or within
territory under the jurisdiction of the United States other than the following: a State of the United
States; the District of Columbia; Puerto Rico; the Virgin Islands; outer Continental Shelf lands
defined in the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (ch. 345, 67 Stat. 462 [43 U.S.C. §§ 1331]);
American Samoa; Guam; Wake Island; Eniwetok Atoll; Kwajalein Atoll; Johnston Island."); Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1982) (incorporates various
provisions of the FLSA, including § 213(f) cited above). For cases holding that ADEA does not apply
extraterritorially, see Zahourek v. Arthur Young & Co., 567 F. Supp. 1453 (D. Col. 1983), aft'd, 750
F.2d 827 (10th Cir. 1984); Pfeiffer v. Wm. Wrigley, Jr. Co., 573 F. Supp. 458 (N.D. I11. 1983), aff'd,
755 F.2d 554 (7th Cir. 1985); Osborne v. United Technologies Corp., 16 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
586 (D. Conn. 1977); Cleary v. United States Lines, Inc., 555 F. Supp. 1251 (D.N.J. 1983), aff'd, 728
F.2d 607 (3d Cir. 1984).
23. See, e.g., United States v. Mitchell, 553 F.2d 996, 1002 (5th Cir. 1977); Steele v. Bulova
Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 285 (1952); Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949); Blackmer v.
United States, 284 U.S. 421, 437 (1932); United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 98 (1922); American
Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 357 (i09); Tamari v. Bache & Co., 730 F.2d 1103,
1107 n. 11 (7th Cir. 1984); Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Nahas, 738 F.2d 487, 493 (D.C.
Cir. 1984); Chitimacha Tribe v. Harry L. Laws Co., 690 F.2d 1157, 1168 (5th Cir. 1982); Pfeiffer v.
Wm. Wrigley, Jr. Co., 573 F. Supp. 458, 459 (N.D. Ill. 1983), aftId, 755 F.2d 554 (7th Cir. 1985); De
Atucha v. Commodity Exch., Inc., 608 F. Supp. 510, 519 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); De Yoreo v. Bell
Helicopter Textron, Inc., 608 F. Supp. 377, 379 (D.C. Tex. 1985); Zahourek v. Arthur Young & Co.,
567 F. Supp. 1453 (D. Col. 1983), aff'd, 750 F.2d 827 (10th Cir. 1984); Cleary v. United States Lines,
Inc., 555 F. Supp. 1251, 1257 (D. N.J. 1983), af'd, 728 F.2d 607 (3d Cir. 1984).
24. See, e.g., Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25 (1982); Lauritzen v. Larsen, 344 U.S. 571, 577-78
(1952); McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 101, 121 (1963);
Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804); Laker Airways v. Sabena,
Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 950 n.155 (D.C. Cir. 1984); United States v. Hensel, 699 F.2d
18, 27 (1st Cir. 1983); Natural Resources Defense Council v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 647 F.2d
1345, 1357 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Federal Trade Comm'n v. Compagnie de Saint-Gobain-Pont-aMousson, 636 F.2d 1300, 1315, 1323 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Schroeder v. Bissell, 5 F.2d 838, 842 (2d Cir.
1925); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 494 F. Supp. 1161, 1178-79 (E.D. Pa.
1980).
25. RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw, supra note 3, § 134.
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jurisdiction, counseling courts to take into account some other discretionary
factors such as international comity. 2 6 This is controversial both because the

justification forjudicial truncation of legislative wishes is unclear, and because
the guidelines for exercising this judicial prerogative are so amorphous.
The second type pertains to adjudicative jurisdiction, which has an
unavoidable impact on legislative jurisdiction. A court may find itself to be an
inconvenient forum for adjudication of a dispute because of its international
elements. 2 7 This "forum non conveniens" power effectively limits legislative
jurisdiction in those circumstances where it is anticipated that other fora
would be unlikely to apply American law. Forum non conveniens dismissals
are therefore vulnerable to accusations that they truncate legislative policies;
however, this criticism may be misplaced because it seems that the majority of
applications of the doctrine have been in cases involving common law, rather
28
than statutory, causes of action.

The Constitution: The final and least relevant consideration is the
Constitution. The reasons that the Constitution has not served as an
important consideration in this process will be discussed below. 29 For the
present, while it is commonly acknowledged that Congress is subject to
constitutional limitations in these matters,3 0 this admission is usually made as
a backhanded concession and has not resulted in any discernible restriction
3
on the extraterritorial application of American law. 1
The most important consideration governing the extraterritorial
application of American law is a hybrid legislative/judicial construct. By and
large, the issue is governed by presumptions which are judicially created and
which often show the influence of international law. At the same time, these
presumptions are presumptions about congressional intent and thus acquire
the status of legislation. It is this hybrid nature of the dominant element in
the methodology that accounts for a substantial part of the problem with our
current situation. Presumptions of legislative intent are something of a
Frankenstein monster: Easy to create, but hard to control.
A.

Statutory Construction and the Judicially Created Cul-de-Sac

The problem with using presumptions of legislative intent relates to a
difficulty in the construction of statutes, although it takes on a special flavor
26. Timberlane v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976).
27. See, e.g., Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981).
28. See, e.g., id. It has been argued that forum non conveniens might be used in international
cases to reduce the friction inherent in extraterritorial application of U.S. law. Note, Forum Non
Conveniens and the Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Antitrust Law, 94 YALE LJ. 1694, 1706-1714 (1985).
29. See infra notes 47-101 and accompanying text.
30. See, e.g., Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 579 (1953); Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 334 U.S.
280, 282-83 (1952); Vermilya-Brown Co. v. Connell, 335 U.S. 377, 381 (1948); Timberlane Lumber
Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597, 612 (9th Cir. 1976); Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v.
Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1334 (2d Cir. 1972); United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416,
443 (2d Cir. 1945); United States v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 518 F. Supp. 1021, 1032 (N.D.
Ohio 1981).
31. In none of the cases cited in note 30, supra, was application of U.S. law declared invalid.
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and urgency in the international context. The general difficulty is the
inflexible position of a court charged with construing statutes, an inflexibility
that may paradoxically cause it to reach results other than what the legislature
would have wanted.
When a court decides whether a statute should apply to a situation which
the statute does not address, it inescapably relies upon its own normative
views. If one result seems more desirable than another, and the legislature
has not expressed a preference, then it seems only reasonable to interpret the
statute in accordance with the court's own view of what is desirable and just.
After all, it is sensible to think that the legislature would have wanted this
"better" result. The result is a peculiar combination of normative reasoning
and deference to Congress, a normative view which is attributed to Congress
even though it does not really express an actual congressional choice.
This process is clearly at work in the extraterritorial application of
American law. Typically, a statute is silent as to its international scope. It
seems sensible to interpret the statute in line with the court's own view of how
far statutes ought to reach. In certain respects, this gives the court the best of
both worlds. The court decides according to its own ideas of justice, usually
shaped by principles and traditions of international law, but it need not
assume explicit responsibility for having done so. The result is then couched
in the language of deference to Congress.
Essentially the same process is at work in the application of state law to
interstate conflicts. Under the modern interest analysis approach in conflict
of laws, the primary objective is said to be the furtherance of legislative
policies. 32 As in the international context, there is rarely explicit guidance in
the statutes; the functional equivalent of presumptions are employed.
Interestingly, the content of these assumptions about the proper reach of
legislative policy is very different from the content of the comparable
presumptions in international law. For example, any notion that legislatures
intend their rules to be applied territorially is completely lacking. 33 Rather,
the assumption is that legislatures act to protect their citizens wherever they go,
a "passive personality" principle that has far fewer admirers in the
34
international context.
Despite these differences, the methodology is the same. In fact, Brainerd
35
Currie entirely approved the reasoning and result in Lauritzen v. Larsen,
apparently holding it out as a paradigm for courts to follow in the interstate
context. 3 6 Given these similarities, it is not surprising that the complaints of
32. See generally Brilmayer, supra note 2.
33. B. CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS 116 (1963) ("a legislature is not likely to append to any statute
dealing with a specific problem any such rule as that the law of the place where the contract is made
shall control").
34. Passive personality is recognized as a potential basis for jurisdiction, but denominates it
"controversial" and "not generally accepted for ordinary torts or crimes." RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW, supra note 3, § 402 comment g.

35.

345 U.S. 571 (1953).

36.

B. CURRIE, supra note 33, at 606.
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overreaching in the international context have their counterpart in the
interstate context.3 7 Both types of analysis are permeated by the philosophy
of unilateralism-of adherence first to one's own rules of law, as opposed to
the making of a neutral choice between local and foreign law. Further, both
exhibit a common methodology, namely deference to legislative wishes
coupled with the necessity for judges to define what those wishes are in terms
of their own normative views.
While this method seems to offer judges the best of both worldsdeference and discretion combined-a problem arises when it appears that
the initial statement of the scope of the law may need to be modified. For
example, it is possible that an "effects" test was adequate in an earlier world
of less interdependent markets, or with a business scene dominated to a
greater degree by American corporations. 38 The likelihood of a foreign
corporation being large enough to have effects on American markets would
then have been smaller. Today's world, however, contains many foreign
corporations whose activities have effects on American markets solely as an
incidental byproduct of their foreign activities.
Whatever the reason, it does seem clear that the current problems with
antitrust law were not so severe forty or fifty years ago. How are courts to
cope with these changes? The common law method typically formulates a
rule for the case at hand, anticipating adjustments and accommodations later
as circumstances change. Where judicial results are framed in terms of
statutory construction, however, it is harder to adjust them to changed
circumstances. The judicially created rule, while just a gloss, attains
something of the status of a statute, and statutes are not as flexible as
common law rules. Thejudge wishing to alter the contours of the effects test,
for example, must apparently be willing to substitute his or her judgment for
the judgment of the legislature.
The method of statutory construction works well enough when a court is
first presented with a silent statute and therefore is writing on a clean slate.
There is no legislative judgment to overrule; it is reasonable to construe the
statute in light of principles of policy, justice, or international law. Once
construed, however, the statute does not present a clean slate. The initial
interpretation chokes off the continuing development of the law because
judges are not supposed to disregard legislation. For the initial construction
of the statute, the strategy works fine. When the time comes for further
judicial elaboration, however, it appears that the court has been led down a
blind alley. The difficulty is related both to the reliance on judicially created
presumptions (the silent statute problem) and the interjurisdictional nature of
the dispute (the narrow nationalism problem).
37. For a recent symposium on the current status of the modern choice of law learning, see 46
OHIO ST. L.J. (1985) (proceedings of the A.A.L.S. meeting, Conflict of Laws section, Jan. 1985).
38. If all of the likely defendants are American corporations, imposition of American law is less
likely to offend foreign nations. It is when foreign corporations doing business with other foreign
corporations find themselves subjected to United States law that the worst problems arise.
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Silent Statutes

Something of the same woodenness occurs with legislative preferences as
opposed to the employment of judicial presumptions about a silent statute.
Here also, inflexibility is the long-range consequence. But there are two
mitigating circumstances when the original decision was founded on actual
inferences from legislative attitudes towards the problem. First, if the choice
of law rule was statutory to begin with, then it is possible that many of its
potential ramifications were adequately considered in its formulation.
Legislatures are better situated than courts to lay out a code in advance.
Because of the responsibility of courts to draw only principled distinctions,
and because of their responsibility to frame a rule in terms of the case at hand,
judicial rules are unavoidably less than complete codifications. Their reliance
on principle makes them vulnerable to "slippery slope" problems;3 9 their
avoidance of dictum means that the original principle, as stated, will probably
not contain all of the necessary qualifications.
The second reason that this methodological problem is not as great where
true statutory construction is involved is that if Congress addressed the
problem in the first instance, there is some hope that Congress will take it up
again when readjustment is needed. Of course, case reports abound with
heartfelt pleas to Congress to rescue courts from archaic or incoherent
statutes. 40 This is as true in international law as in any other area of law. The
problem is worse, however, when Congress has never addressed it at all and
the decisions rest solely on judicial presumptions. It seems that congressional
attention in the first instance might indicate a greater likelihood of
congressional attention in the future.
C.

Narrow Nationalism

These problems with judicial presumptions are general problems; it is not
only in the international law context that we find silent statutes and judicial
value judgments. Yet there are also reasons to believe that the special nature
of international law exacerbates these methodological difficulties. A decision
whether to apply American law should take into account both the costs and
benefits of doing so. The benefits, however, are more easily cognizable under
a methodology of statutory construction than are the costs. Thus, when the
time comes to reassess the desirability of extending American law to disputes
with international components, a court may feel inhibited from limiting the
reach of a statute. It may take an unnecessarily narrow and nationalistic
perspective.
To appreciate how this happens, assume that an initial decision has already
been reached about the "presumably intended" reach of a statute. The
decision reflects that judge's views with respect to both the nature of the
policies underlying the statute and whether or not these policies apply to the
39.
40.

See generally Schauer, Slippe-v Slopes, 99 HARV. L. REv. 361 (1985).
See generally G. CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982).
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instant case. The holding indicates that the desired benefits of the statute can
best be achieved by applying it to cases of that sort. Once this conclusion is
reached, it becomes difficult for a later court to deny those "benefits" out of
deference to the needs of foreign nations. The reason is that the "costs" of
the earlier decision are borne by outsiders.
The antitrust context provides an illustration. Simplifying somewhat for
purposes of the example, assume that only an effects test limits the outer
bounds of legislative intent. It is presumed, in other words, that Congress
would wish the antitrust laws to apply whenever there is an anticompetitive
effect in the United States, because it would wish to deter the anticompetitive
impact on U.S. markets. Once the statute has been so construed, it becomes
difficult for a court to curtail the reach of the statute. The reason is that the
rationale for so doing would turn on avoiding offense to foreign nations. This
rationale is not phrased in terms of American interests, but rather in terms of
the interests of other states. And the power to restrict American law in order
to further the interests of foreign nations is, to say the least, problematic. A
court is unlikely to substitute its foreign policy judgment for a congressional
judgment under any circumstances, but especially to further foreign interests.
Since congressional intent has already been declared to require application,
there is no principled basis for later limitation. Respect for local democratic
institutions requires the effectuation of American policies, and expansionist
tendencies have preempted the high moral ground.
This is particularly apparent when put into an historical framework. The
objections of other nations are likely only to become clear after the
commitment to the expansionist mode of statutory interpretation has been
made. The result is that these pressures will come too late to be taken into
account in formulating the presumption of statutory scope. They will
inevitably be framed instead as the "costs" of the congressional policy. Once
viewed in this light, it will be an uphill battle to obtain recognition for
arguments to restrict jurisdiction. The restrictive arguments will be seen as
disagreement with legislative policy and, moreover, as motivated by a desire
to minimize the costs imposed on other nations. The judicial response to
arguments framed in such terms is likely to be: "Take your objections to
Congress."
Aside from the fact that courts do not consider themselves authorized to
promote the interests of foreign nations, there is an additional problem with
judges responding to such considerations. Concerns of international comity
are not likely to be explicitly and directly embodied in any particular statute.
Rather, they are general concerns that inform many different sorts of
enactments, but are not necessarily the motivating force behind any one
specific enactment. There is therefore no special reason why a court would
find such considerations in the legislative history of the particular domestic
statute it is construing. Lacking explicit guidance in the substantive statute
being construed, a court is likely to reiterate the common maxim that the
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judicial branch is not adept at making foreign policy. 4 1 While the policies in
favor of extending the law are likely to loom large, and the benefits of doing
so will seem direct, the policies counseling moderation are likely to be
amorphous and to be embodied in many different enactments but not
pointedly in any one. The selfish gains of extending the law are short-lived
and apparent. The long-range benefits of restraint may be just as important,
but harder to define precisely. Foreign policy, in other words, involves more
politics than principle. While comity is probably a priority in Congress, it is
difficult for courts to formulate standards to take comity into account.
Thus, a court might find itself stretching the law in slavish pursuit of
congressional goals to an extent that Congress would not desire. It is not
possible to examine the antitrust laws and determine the "proper" amount of
deference to foreign nations. A standard of deference does not inhere in the
antitrust laws themselves, and there is no other authoritative source from
which deductions can be made. The flexibility and discretion that Congress
might itself employ in setting a standard for the extraterritorial application of
its antitrust laws cannot easily be determined by the courts.
This analysis is borne out by the treatment of recent efforts to cut back on
antitrust jurisdiction. There are two sources of dissatisfaction with American
expansionist tendencies, one practical and one theoretical. The practical
impetus behind these efforts to restrict American law is the strong negative
reaction of foreign parties and governments. The very source of the political
pressure makes judicial reform less likely, however, to the extent that it
suggests that restrictions would be based on something other than American
interests in seeing the antitrust laws enforced. The theoretical impetus
behind these efforts is a principled adherence to international law, particularly
the multilateralist traditions which counsel respect for the interests of other
states. Again, the emphasis on the needs of other states only makes matters
worse from the judicial perspective.
The role of these considerations in actual decisions is apparent in Laker
Airways v. Sabena.4 2 In explaining its refusal to balance the interests of other
nations, Judge Wilkey's opinion makes clear the relative importance of
congressionally defined interests and judicial solicitude for the interests of
foreign nations:
The suggestion has been made that this court should engage in some form of interest
balancing, permitting only a "reasonable" assertion of prescriptive jurisdiction to be
implemented. However, this approach is unsuitable when courts are forced to choose
between a domestic law which is designed to protect domestic interests, and a foreign
law which is calculated to thwart the implementation of the domestic law in order to
protect foreign interests allegedly threatened by the objectives of the domestic
law. . . . An English or American court cannot refuse to enforce a law its political
branches have already determined is desirable and necessary. . . . Given the inherent
limitations of the Judiciary, which must weigh these issues in the limited context of
adversarial litigation, we seriously doubt whether we could adequately chart the

41.

See generallv L.

HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION

"doctrines of special deference").
42. 731 F.2d 909 (1984).

206 (1972) (describing
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competing problems and priorities that inevitably define the scope of any nation's
interest in a legislated remedy. . . . Despite the real obligation of courts to apply
international law and foster comity, domestic courts do not sit as internationally
constituted tribunals. Domestic courts are created by national constitutions and
statutes to enforce primarily national laws. The courts of most developed countries
follow international law only to the extent it is not overridden by national law ....
Judges are not politicians. The courts are not organs of political compromise . . .
[and] both institutional limitations on the judicial process and Constitutional
restrictions on the exercise of judicial power make it unacceptable for the Judiciary to
seize the political initiative and determine that legitimate application
of American laws
43
must evaporate when challenged by a foreign jurisdiction.

An identical drama has been played out in the context of interstate conflict
of laws. Here, the modern approaches speak in terms of "interests." Once a
judicial holding declares what a state's interests are, these achieve the
institutionally superior status of legislative command. In the eyes of interest
analysts, it virtually then becomes treason for a state court to respond to any
other
consideration.
Respect
for
another
state's
interests
is
countermajoritarian in that it neglects the wishes of the forum state's elected
superiors. Rules which would cabin the assertion of these interests are
branded as "metaphysical" in the same sense as is international law. It is
44
"law" without a positive law source.
D.

The Paradox of Delegation

The situation described above is really very paradoxical, in both the
interstate and international arenas. A comparable problem arises whenever
one agency is charged with carrying out the wishes of another but is given
insufficient guidance. If it phrases its decisions in terms of the wishes of its
superiors, then the resulting inflexibility may cause it to be unable to decide
as those superiors might actually wish.
The first half of the paradox lies in the fact that the rules which later
constrain a court's authority are judicially created in the first instance. The
effects test and the interest analysis approach to conflict of laws are not
legislatively directed. Rather, they are judicial efforts to arrive at sound
results. Yet because the general background includes statutory directives, the
jurisdictional issue is framed in terms of statutory construction. Thus, while
the cul-de-sac is of judicial making, it cannot easily be judicially corrected.
The suppositions of local policy, against which the interest of foreign states or
nations are necessarily aligned, are judicial suppositions and nothing more.
The second half of the paradox lies in the fact that the interests of foreign
states or nations might very well be thought important by the legislature itself.
Where legislatures do speak to choice of law issues, they typically do not
extend their power to the utmost. 4 - This seems particularly true with
43.

731 F.2d at 948-54.

44.

See generally Brilmayer, Interest Analysis and the Myth of Legislative Intent, 78 MicH. L. REV. 392

(1980).
45. For example, to my knowledge no state legislature has asserted legislative jurisdiction to the
limits of the Constitution, as some have with regard to adjudicative jurisdiction.
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Congress, which obviously is aware of and sensitive to foreign policy
concerns. Any action which will impact on foreign countries is undertaken
with at least an awareness of the possibility of retaliation and reprisal, and
sometimes this consideration will be influential.
The paradox of delegation is that because of institutional decisionmaking
constraints, the decisionmaker who has been delegated the authority to
decide may decide differently than the institution whose instructions it is
charged with following. This is a common phenomenon; the range of
interests which the delegated decisionmaker considers may be narrower than
the interests that the delegating decisionmaker would have consulted.
Another example consists of institutional trustees who are charged with
investing money for trust beneficiaries. Typically, they are limited in their
investment options, so that they may neither invest in risky ventures nor take
"extraneous" concerns into account in making the choice. Thus, for instance,
a trustee might be reluctant to divest profitable assets in South Africa because
of its fiduciary responsibilities, despite the fact that the beneficiary would be
free to do so and might very well exercise that option.
Similarly, federal courts are charged with applying state law in diversity
cases as the state courts would. To the extent that this means consulting the
relevant statutes and precedents, a federal court reaches the same result as a
state court. State courts, however, have the power to overrule themselves.
Since federal courts are not entitled to overrule state court decisions, the
result is that the federal court version of state court justice may be more
46
wooden than the state court's version.
The most obvious solution to the problem would be to expand the range
of considerations that the decisionmaker may rely upon to include all
considerations that the institutional superior might invoke. In the context of
international choice of law decisions, this would mean that in its initial
solution to the problem of extraterritorial scope, a court should formulate a
precise and sensible rule that incorporates the proper amount of deference to
foreign interests, and does not overstate the scope of United States interests.
Then no further readjustment would be needed. At the initial stage, it is
methodologically easier to respond to considerations of comity in
determining the relevant "legislative intent" because a court is writing on a
blank page. When a court uses a presumption against extraterritorial
application, for example, it relies upon comity notions by imputing them to
Congress.
Yet, while it is obviously advantageous for a court to "get it right the first
time," it is too much to hope that courts always will. If nothing else, there is
the problem of changed circumstances; the real world rapidly changes with
respect to any rule that might be formulated. There is also the impossibility
of anticipating all of the problematic factual variations in advance. Flexibility
46. See generall), P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 708-10 (1973).
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is necessary and, from a broader perspective, it is certainly appropriate. But
within the institutional confines of the interpretation of a particular statute,
presumed statutory construction leads to a methodological dead end.
III
THE ROLE OF THE CONSTITUTION

Regarding the methodological problems with presumptions of statutory
intent, the international context is strikingly similar to the interstate context.
Regarding certain other methodological issues, the two contexts are rather
different. In particular, they differ with regard to the relative prominence of
constitutional limitations.
In the interstate context, constitutional challenges to the application of
forum law are not successful as frequently as they once were. 4 7 The
application of local law is upheld in situations where it would, undoubtedly,
49
once have been reversed; 4 8 so much is recognized by the Supreme Court.
Nevertheless, constitutional argument continues to play a prominent role in
conflict of laws adjudication. The scholarly literature, in addition, pays as
much

attention

to

constitutional

limits as it ever did. 50

Thus,

while

constitutional limits have different contours than they used to, they are far
from dead.
In the international context, by contrast, the Constitution plays virtually
no role at all. The Supreme Court has never invalidated the extraterritorial
application of federal law on constitutional grounds. 5 ' In fact, none of the
Court's decisions on extraterritorial application even seriously discuss the
constitutional issues. 5 2 The most attention these decisions ever give to the
issue is a backhanded reference to the Constitution at the outset of the
discussion about congressional intent. 5 3 For example, in Alcoa Judge Hand
47. Compare Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981) (choice of law controls) with New
York Life Ins. Co. v. Dodge, 246 U.S. 357 (1918) (law of place of contracting governs).
48. See, e.g., R. CRAMPTON, D. CURRIE, & H. KAY, CONFLICT OF LAws 403-51 (3d ed. 1981)
(outlining history of constitutional development of choice of law).
49. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. at 308-14 (It is no longer true that a single state is
entitled to apply its law.).
50. For a survey of scholarly reaction to the Hague case, see J. MARTIN, CONFLICT OF LAWS:
CASES AND MATERIALS 338-42 (2d ed. 1984).
51. Cf Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597, 608 n.12 (9th Cir. 1976)
(jurisdiction rarely found lacking).
52. Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide and Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690 (1962); Lauritzen v.
Larsen, 345 U.S. 571 (1953); Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280 (1952); Foley Bros. v. Filardo,
336 U.S. 281 (1949); Vermilya-Brown Co. v. Connell, 335 U.S. 377 (1948); Blackmer v. United
States, 284 U.S. 421 (1932); United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268 (1927); Thomsen v.
Cayser, 243 U.S. 66 (1917); United States v. Pacific and Arctic Ry. and Navigation Co., 228 U.S. 87
(1913); United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911); American Banana Co. v.
United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
53. See, e.g., Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 579 (1953); Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S.
280, 282-83 (1952); Vermilya-Brown Co. v. Connell, 335 U.S. 377, 381 (1948); Timberlane Lumber
Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597, 612 (9th Cir. 1976); Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v.
Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1334 (2d Cir. 1945); United States v. Firestone Tire and Rubber Co., 518 F.
Supp. 1021, 1032 (N.D. Ohio 1981).
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wrote, "the only question open is whether Congress intended to impose the
liability, and whether our own Constitution permitted it to do so." 5 4 One
might think that this statement initiated discussion of two points: statutory
construction
and
constitutional
interpretation.
Nonetheless,
the
constitutional point never really resurfaced in the opinion.
Similarly, the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law recognizes that the
Constitution limits American foreign relations powers. 5 5 It never develops
this point as to choice of law, however, despite the fact that some of its
proposed limitations on American law, such as the reasonableness
requirements, 56 might find constitutional support. 5 7 The secondary literature

likewise is virtually silent on this issue. 58 Most telling, however, is that
constitutional arguments rarely have been advanced in the briefs of parties
resisting application of American law. 59 One wonders what lies behind this
conspiracy of silence.

In part, this inattention to constitutional issues merely highlights the
methodology of the presumption of statutory construction. Precisely because
the interpretation is based upon presumed and not explicit congressional
intent, the courts have great latitude to shape the outer contours of the
extraterritorial application of American law. Since their notions of fairness
find expression at this stage of the method, it is unlikely that the result of the
interpretive process will offend their views on constitutional propriety.
Constitutional analysis becomes, in fact, virtually redundant.
The same cannot be said for the extraterritorial application of state law.
While this issue also is shaped by presumptions, there are at least two reasons
why the interpretive process does not anticipate the constitutional discussion
and render it unnecessary. First, in the interstate context the intellectual
school propounded presumptions of construction that were both highly
aggressive and somewhat dubious. For example, they relied in essence upon

the "passive personality" principle which has found less support in American
54.
55.
56.
57.

United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am. 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir. 1945).
See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw § 721 (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1985).
Id. § 403.
Reasonableness is an important concept in interstate jurisdiction. See, e.g., R. WEINTRAUB,

COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 503, 505-06, 517 (2d ed. 1980) (suggesting reasonableness

test and citing cases).
58. For an interesting discussion of the Constitution in international disputes, see Label, The
Linits of Constitutional Power: Conflicts Between Foreign Policy and International Law, 72 VA. L. REV. 1071
(1985). The author's argument is different from mine in several respects, however. For one thing,
he is concerned with public and not private international law. For another, his conclusion is that
international law is to some degree constitutionally compelled; mine does not depend on
international law in any way.
59. See, e.g., Brief for Petitioner, Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571 (1953); Brief for Petitioner,
Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280 (1952); Brief for Petitioner, Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S.
281 (1949); Brief for Petitioner, Vermilya-Brown Co. v. Connell, 335 U.S. 377 (1948); Brief for
Respondent, United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268 (1927); Brief for Petitioner, Thomsen v.
Cayser, 243 U.S. 66 (1917); Brief for Respondent, United States v. Pacific and Arctic Ry. and
Navigation Co., 228 U.S. 87 (1913): Brief for Respondent, United States v. American Tobacco Co.,
221 U.S. 106 (1911); Brief for Respondent, American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347
(1909). But see Brief for Plaintiffs, Dresser Indus., Inc. v. Baldridge, 549 F. Supp. 108 (D.D.C. 1982).
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foreign relations law. 60 They also claimed that territorially-based distinctions
violate equal protection. 61 When the courts adopted the methodology, they
brought in all of its baggage at the same time, including such presumptions.
It is small wonder that the method precipitated a virtual civil war within the
ranks of constitutional conflicts scholars. 6 2 The presumptions relied on in the
63
international context are less likely to provoke constitutional challenge.
Second, in the interstate context the statutory construction issue is a
matter of state law, while the constitutional issue is a matter of federal law.
Where the Supreme Court reviews a lower court decision applying local law, it
does not have the option of merely reinterpreting the statute; the Court has
no authority to contradict state courts on issues of state law. 64 The only
device the Court may employ for limiting the reach of local law is
constitutional invalidation. As between the two, the usual preference would
be to base decisions upon statutory construction, for even outside the
international/interstate context, prudential considerations favor modest
interpretation of statutes over an aggressive interpretation which forces the
constitutional issue. 6 5 The greater attention to constitutional issues in the
interstate context may simply indicate the unavailability of this preferred
method for limiting the extraterritorial application of local law.
Under this analysis of the relative dearth of constitutional holdings in the
international context, it may be expected that constitutional argument will
become more important in the future. The reason relates to the discussion
earlier about the inflexibility inherent in the presumptive interpretation
methodology. 66 Once the outer limits of the applicability of American law are
established, it is no longer possible to use statutory construction to perform
an essentially constitutional function. To do so would require admitting that
the earlier decisions about the intended reach of the statute were mistaken.
As there would be no basis in the legislative history or the statutory language
for this reinterpretation, the decision could not be cast as furthering
legislative wishes. The true rationale would have to lie elsewhere, such as in
the recognition that the original interpretation might have been stated too
broadly, given the court's own view of a desirable result. If a court cannot
60.
61.

RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, supra note 3, § 402 comment g.
B. CURRIE, supra note 33, at 123, 146, 162.

62. A general discussion of the method and its critics can be found in any standard reference
book on conflicts. See, e.g., L. BRILMAYER, supra note 13, at 229-243.
63. In particular, they tend to rely on the presumption that the law's application is territorial,
which is more conservative than either interest analysis or the "better law" approach, when foreign
law can be applied without warning.
64. Murdoch v. Mayor of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall) 590, 626 (1874) (To support the general
proposition that the Court will not review judgments of state courts that rest on adequate and
independent state grounds, the Court stated that "The State courts are the appropriate tribunals ...
for the decisions of questions arising under their local law, whether statutory otherwise.").
65. Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 341, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., dissenting in part). In
acknowledging the basic judicial duty to avoid decisions on constitutional grounds, Justice Brandeis
declared that the Court would not pass upon a constitutional question where a decision could be
reached on some narrower ground.
66. See spra notes 18-31 and accompanying text.
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then write an opinion to the effect that it now can see that Congress really
wanted something else, then it will be forced to rely upon the Constitution,
the only remaining source of limitations.
To attribute judicial policy decisions to Congress in the first place,
however, persists in posing problems. It has already been seen that the
original hybrid legislative/judicial decision thwarts later efforts to restrict its
scope because of its legislative nature; 6 7 neither common law alteration nor
statutory reinterpretation seems a feasible means for reassessing the
extraterritorial application of American law. Unfortunately, the judicial
aspect of the hybrid decision also confounds later efforts at constitutional
retrenchment because the original decision which established the problematic
contours is also something of a constitutional precedent. Since the statute
was presumably interpreted so as not to provoke constitutional issues, the
interpretation which was adopted presumably does not offend the
Constitution. Thus, although there may have been little or no explicit analysis
of constitutional doctrine, constitutional argument seems foreclosed by the
original holding. Because the initial holding supposedly represented both
statutory and constitutional law, there is neither a statutory nor constitutional
basis for later restriction.
This will be made clearer by a concrete illustration. The previous section
considered the difficulties of a common law court attempting to revise the
effects test once it becomes ensconced as the preferred congressional
solution. 68 It has been noted that courts cannot truncate congressional
policies, particularly for reasons of foreign policy concerns or in order to
advance the interests of foreign states. 69 However, constitutional analysis is
also thwarted because when the effects test was formulated it was presumably
influenced by the desire for an interpretation that would not offend
constitutional limitations. Essentially, the effects test was approved as passing
constitutional muster in the case in which it was originally adopted. 70 While
the Supreme Court is not completely bound by such implicit constitutional
holdings, it may nonetheless be less receptive to constitutional arguments
because of these earlier decisions, and certainly the lower courts may find
these implicit holdings to be persuasive.
The methodological cul-de-sac therefore extends even into the
constitutional arena. Perhaps it explains why, as an historical matter,
constitutional arguments have not been more prominent. It does not,
however, justify continuing to ignore them. It is open to the Supreme Court
to address the role of the Constitution in the international conflict of laws.
We turn to that issue now: Does the Constitution apply?
It seems, at least prima facie, that the Constitution ought to limit the
extraterritorial application of American law. The most obvious source of
67. Seesupra p. 186.
68. See supra text accompanying notes 32-46.
69. See supra p. 20-22.
70.

United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
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limitations is the fifth amendment due process requirement, although there
are other, less obvious, limitations. 7 1 Due process is emphasized initially
because two of the limits that might restrict a state's right to apply local law in
the interstate context are inapplicable to the international application of
American law. These include the commerce and full faith and credit clauses.
The commerce clause has been used to invalidate the application of a state's
anti-takeover statute to transactions occurring in substantial part in another
state. 72 However, it does not apply to limit congressional power in the
international context because it is a grant of power to Congress and not a
73
restriction on the exercise of power that otherwise exists.
The full faith and credit clause is also not relevant. The reason is not (as
with the commerce clause) that the source of authority being challenged is
federal rather than state. The full faith and credit clause imposes
requirements on federal exercises of power, at least in the context of
judgments. 74 Rather, the reason is that the alternative source of law is
international. The clause imposes a duty of comity only with regard to the
laws or judgments of states; its protection does not extend to laws of other
countries. 75 It is also possible that even if it did apply, it would not pose any
threat to extraterritorial regulation. In the interstate context, it has been read
to have minimal significance, merely duplicating the protections of the due
76
process clause.
Of the clauses that limit state power, only due process remains. When the
source of challenged authority is federal, rather than state, these due process
limits are found in the fifth rather than the fourteenth amendment; but in
most contexts, it is not clear that this should matter. 77 The current treatment
of several analogous situations suggests that federal legislative jurisdiction
ought to be limited by due process. The three analogous situations are:
constitutional limits on state adjudicative jurisdiction in the international
context; constitutional limits on state legislative jurisdiction in the
international context; and constitutional limits on federal adjudicative
jurisdiction in the international context. These analogous problems are
represented in the following table, along with the problem presently under

71.
See infra notes 122-126 and accompanying text.
with me some of his ideas on such limits.

72.

I am indebted to Harold Koh for sharing

Edgar v. Mite Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982). See also Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New

York State Liquor Auth., 106 S. Ct. 2080 (1986).
73. The commerce clause limits the states only because their actions may have an impact on a
federal power that is constitutionally granted; there is no comparable power with which the
application of federal law might conflict.

74.

See, e.g., Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 95 (1980).

Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Tremblay, 223 U.S. 185, 190 (1912) (The full faith and credit clause of
75.
the Constitution does not extend to judgments of foreign states or nations and the Court, absent a
treaty, has no jurisdiction to review a state court judgment on the ground that it failed to give full
faith and credit to a judgment of a court of a foreign country.).

76.

Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981) (plurality opinion).

77. The primary difference between the two involves the differential treatment of aliens, which is
more likely to be permissible if done by Congress.
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consideration, namely the constitutional
jurisdiction in the international context.

limits

on

federal

29

legislative

Type of Jurisdiction
Source of Authority

Judicial

Legislative

State

14th Amend.

14th Amend.

Federal

5th Amend.

5th Amend.

The upper left hand corner represents the limits on state adjudicative
jurisdiction in the international context. Of course, everyone is familiar with
the limits on state adjudicative jurisdiction in the domestic context. Those
limits, also founded on the fourteenth amendment, are the focus of such
famous decisions as InternationalShoe v. Washington,78 Hanson v. Denckla, 79 and
Shaffer v. Heitner.8 0 The test is one of "minimum contacts" and "fair play and
substantial justice." 8'
However, the identical test has been employed when
the alternative forum is another nation, as opposed to another state.8 2 Such
cases as Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia 83 make this clear. This is perhaps
mildly surprising given that one basis for limitations of adjudicative jurisdiction is deference to alternative fora,8 4 and, at least under the full faith and
credit clause, foreign nations receive less deference than other states.8 5 Furthermore, it has been argued that under a theory of "jurisdiction by necessity" plaintiffs should be allowed to sue in the United States if they would
otherwise have to travel to another country to litigate.8 6 The principle seems
to be settled, nonetheless, that the usual minimum contacts standard applies.
In particular, the jurisdiction by necessity argument has not received a warm
7
response from the Court.
State legislative jurisdiction in the international context is, likewise, limited
by the Constitution. Again, the cases with which we are most familiar are
those limiting state legislative jurisdiction in the interstate context.8 8 Nonetheless, occasional cases address the issue in the international arena. Home
78. International Shoe Co. v. Washington Office of Unemployment Compensation and
Placement, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
79. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
80. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
81. International Shoe Co. v. Washington Office of Unemployment Compensation and
Placement, 326 U.S. at 316.
82. Koster v. Automark Indus., 640 F.2d 77 (7th Cir. 1981).
83. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984).
84. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 293-94 (1980).
85. Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930).
86.
87.

Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, 466 U.S. at 419 n.13.
Id.

88. See, e.g., Order of United Commercial Travelers v. Wolfe, 331 U.S. 586 (1947); John
Hancock Mut.Life Ins. Co. v. Yates, 299 U.S. 178 (1936); Hartford Accident and Indem. Co. v. Delta
and Pine Land Co., 292 U.S. 143 (1934); Bradford Elec. Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145 (1932);
New York Life Ins. Co. v. Dodge, 246 U.S. 357 (1918); McCluney v.Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 649
F.2d 578 (8th Cir. 1981), aff'd mem., 454 U.S. 1071 (1981).
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Insurance v. Dick 89 is the best example. While over fifty years old, this decision
continues to be cited by the Court with approval. 90 As with the limits on adjudicative jurisdiction, the test for constitutionality does not seem to vary from
the interstate to international contexts; by its citations of Home Insurance v. Dick
in interstate cases the Court has seemed to suggest that the tests are the
same. 9 1
The lower left corner of the matrix presents a somewhat more interesting
problem. 9 2 These cases exemplify the limits on federal adjudicative jurisdiction in the international context. In the search for examples of this phenomenon, one is tempted at first to list cases such as Insurance Corp. of Ireland.93 In
that case, the Supreme Court discussed the constitutional limits on the federal
court adjudication of an international dispute. Such examples do not really
count, however. In most situations, federal courts are limited by the restric94
Such
tions on the long arm jurisdiction of the states in which they sit.
9
5
restrictions are simply a function of the Erie doctrine and the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure 9 6 and are not imposed for any constitutional reason.
One must, therefore, restrict one's search to cases where such doctrinal
limitations are inoperative. It is only where Congress has provided for nationwide or worldwide service of process that the Erie doctrine and federal rules
do not apply. This occurs in many of the substantive contexts which have
been important also in the development of extraterritorial legislative jurisdiction, namely antitrust and securities laws. 9 7 Although the Supreme Court has

not addressed the issue, the lower courts seem uniformly to have assumed
that the fifth amendment limits congressional attempts to provide adjudicative
jurisdiction.9 8 In some respects, the fifth and fourteenth amendment tests
may not be identical; for instance, contacts with the nation, rather than with a
particular state, can be considered relevant. 9 9 But this variation is consistent
with the existence of some constitutional limitation, and it furthermore
reflects the common principle that an individual must have contacts with the
sovereign that is attempting to assert authority.
89. Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 387 (1930).
90. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 309 (1981) (plurality opinion).
91. Id. at 309-11.
92. See supra table p. 29.
93. Insurance Corp. v. Compagnie de Bauxites, 456 U.S. 694 (1982).
94. See, e.g., Arrowsmith v. United Press Int'l, 320 F.2d 219 (2d Cir. 1963).
95. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
96. FED. R. Civ. P. 4.
97. See, e.g., The Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12, 13, 14-19, 20, 21, 22-27 (1982); The
Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77 (1982); The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78
(1982).
98. Kramer Motors, Inc. v. British Leyland, Ltd., 628 F.2d 1175 (9th Cir. 1980); Paulson Inv.
Co. v. Norbay Sec., Inc., 603 F. Supp. 615 (D. Or. 1984); Staffin v. Greenberg, 509 F. Supp. 825, 831,
832 (E.D. Pa. 1981), aff'd, 672 F.2d 1196 (3d Cir. 1982); Alco Standard Corp. v. Benalal, 345 F.
Supp. 14, 24, 25 (E.D. Pa. 1972); Oxford First Corp. v. PNC Liquidating Corp., 372 F. Supp. 191,
198-203 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
99. Staffin v. Greenberg, 509 F. Supp. 825, 831 (E.D. Pa. 1981), aff'd, 672 F.2d 1196 (2d Cir.
1982); Alco Standard Corp. v. Benalal, 345 F. Supp. 14, 24, 25 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
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This brings us to the problem case, namely the constitutional limits on the
application of federal law to cases with international elements. As noted
above, the Court has on several occasions stated in dictum that such assertions of legislative authority must satisfy the Constitution.1 00 But, as also
noted, it seems never to have taken the possibility of failing to meet the Constitution's requirements seriously. I0 ' Should it be assumed that the fifth
amendment is relevant? Drawing on the other cells in the matrix, it might be
argued that legislative jurisdiction is sometimes limited in the international
context. Furthermore, federal assertions of jurisdiction are also sometimes
limited. Why then should not the Constitution limit federal legislative
jurisdiction?
At this point, it seems that the prima facie case has been made. There is at
least a plausible argument for recognizing constitutional limits on the extraterritorial application of American law. The focus next must be to determine
whether there are good reasons for treating federal legislative jurisdiction differently from other assertions of sovereign power in the international context.
Three possible arguments come to mind. First, the congressional power over
foreign affairs may be such as to render judicial scrutiny inappropriate.
Second, nonresident aliens may have fewer constitutional rights than American citizens. Third, there may be something anomalous about giving the
Constitution greater extraterritorial application than a federal statute.
One clear difference between invalidation
1. Congress and Foreign Affairs.
of state choice of law in the international context and invalidation of federal
legislative jurisdiction lies in the congressional control over foreign affairs. It
seems at least arguable that Congress should have greater leeway in deciding
upon the scope of federal statutes than the states do with state statutes,
because the grant of contitutional power to Congress explicitly includes the
regulation of international relations. 0 2 State assertions of power, in contrast,
have on occasion been invalidated precisely because of their international
implications, intruding upon the federal prerogative respecting foreign

relations.

103

This argument can be carried one step further to preclude all judicial
scrutiny whatsoever of the exercise of foreign affairs powers by Congress.
The political question doctrine, one offshoot of the Article III "case or
controversy" limitation, 10 4 removes certain issues from the scope of judicial
review.' 0 5 Furthermore, this doctrine has been found to be applicable to
certain aspects of presidential and congressional power in the international
100.
101.
102.
103.
(1968);
104.
105.

See supra notes 51-54 and accompanying text.
Id.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
Japan Line, Ltd. v. Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434 (1979); Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429
Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
See generally L. BRILMAYER, supra note 13, 80-111.
L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 208-16 (1972).
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context.""! If accepted, such an application of the political question doctrine
would support the view that the courts ought not to review extraterritorial
assertions of federal power.

The political question doctrine, however, does not extend this far. First,
note that the doctrine has not prevented courts from questioning
07
congressional grants of judicial jurisdiction under the fifth amendment.
Moreover, the subject of extraterritoriality is not the sort of issue that ought
to be denied judicial review. Unlike decisions whether to wage war or
recognize foreign governments, decisions about legislative jurisdiction are the
sorts of decisions courts are accustomed to making. Indeed, the rules of
extraterritorial application presently under attack are of judicial origin,
although phrased as a matter of statutory construction. Therefore, the "lack
ofjudicially manageable standards" argument which has pointed towards the
existence of a political question in other contexts 0 8 is simply not pertinent to
judicial review of legislative jurisdiction.
Furthermore, the posture of cases involving the issue of legislative
jurisdiction differs from the posture of most cases in which political questions
have been found. Where a plaintiff attempts a constitutional challenge to an
ongoing program, a court can declare the existence of a political question and
leave the situation in the status quo ante by simply refusing to intervene. But
a person seeking judicial review of assertions of legislative jurisdiction is
typically already involved in a judicial proceeding as a defendant. A court
cannot simply refuse to become involved; if it finds a political question, it is
obliged to apply American law and effectuate a potentially unconstitutional
result. This posture directly implicates the argument that Justice Marshall
made for the existence of judicial review: If a court becomes involved in
10 9
applying a law, then it is obliged also to assess its constitutionality.
Along these lines, it may be relevant that in the international context the
political question doctrine has proven most potent with respect to challenges
based upon either separation of powers or lack of an affirmative grant of
congressional authority in the Constitution. Thus, Henkin's discussion of the
political question doctrine in Foreign Affairs and the Constitution recognizes that
foreign affairs issues are supposedly typical examples of political questions. ' 10
Most such examples, however, deal with problems of whether some particular
branch of government has the affirmative power to take some particular
action. Henkin adds that the courts are not likely to avoid challenges to
106. Redish, Judicial Review and the "Political Question, " 79 Nw. L. REV. 1031 (1984) (Citing
Crockett v. Reagan, 720 F.2d 1355 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (per curiam), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1251 (1984), as
a recent example of the federal courts' refusal to consider the legality of the President's activities in
Nicaragua.).
107. Kramer Motors, Inc. v. British Leyland, Ltd., 628 F.2d 1175 (9th Cir. 1980); Paulson Inv.
Co. v. Norbay Sec., Inc., 603 F. Supp. 615 (D. Or. 1984); Staffin v. Greenberg, 509 F. Supp. 825, 831,
832 (E.D. Pa. 1981); Alco Standard Corp. v. Benalal, 345 F. Supp. 14, 24, 25 (E.D. Pa. 1972); Oxford
First Corp. v. PNC Liquidating Corp., 372 F. Supp. 191, 198-208 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
108. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962): L. BRILMAYER, supra note 13.
109. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).

110.

L.

HENKIN,

supra note 105, at 210.
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Although challenges to
actions alleged to violate individual rights.'
extraterritorial authority are in some sense related to the issue of Congress'
affirmative power,' 1 2 they are also appropriately viewed as claims of individual
rights.- Thus, it seems that assertions of legislative jurisdiction are not
shielded by the political question doctrine.
The fact that a court should not defer completely to Congress under the
political question doctrine does not speak to the question of the proper
standard of review. In other international contexts implicating individual
rights, the Court has weighed congressional evaluations of national interest
heavily in determining whether the challenged action passes constitutional
This suggests, for instance, that if Congress made findings of fact
muster.''
about the likelihood of effects in the United States or about the importance of
market competition, these might be entitled to great deference. This
argument, however, merely counsels substantive deference to congressional
determinations; it does not mandate complete judicial refusal to address the
issues.
Another argument
2. Does the Constitution Protect Aliens Acting Abroad?
suggesting that constitutional scrutiny might be inappropriate is the argument
that the due process clause does not protect aliens acting abroad. It is clear
that aliens are protected by the due process clause and other protections
while they are in the United States, 14 although in certain circumstances their
rights under the fifth amendment are subordinated to the congressional
power to regulate immigration and naturalization.' 1 5 What is less clear is
whether nonresident aliens are protected while they act abroad; arguably they
are not.
The applicability of the due process clause to aliens acting abroad may be
irrelevant. The due process clause need not apply directly to the activities
that occurred abroad; instead it applies to a local occurrence, namely to the
litigation underway in U.S. courts. American courts ought not to deprive an
individual of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, which they
would do if they overextended American law. It is local litigation that triggers
the constitutional protection.
The point may be illustrated by analogy to another type of due process
problem, namely the enforcement of a judgment rendered without judicial
jurisdiction. If an American court attempts to adjudicate a controversy with
no American elements, the cases cited earlier suggest that this would violate
the due process limitations of the fifth and fourteenth amendments. It would
11. Id. at 210, 216.
112. This is because a nexus with the United States is necessary to empower Congress to
regulate; but contrast the challenges discussed in the text, infra following note 121, which are based
purely on the lack of any affirmative grant of power in the Constitution.
113. L. HENKIN, supra note 105, at 252 (contours of individual rights different in international
context because of national policy and interest as defined by Congress).
114. See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw §§ 16-22 (1978) (discrimination
against resident aliens).

115.

Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792-99 (1977).
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apparently not matter that the defendant was an alien, nor that the activity in
question occurred outside the United States. Indeed, it is because of the
absence of local elements that due process would be violated. The local
element to which due process attaches is the litigation.
Similarly, a defendant owning property in the United States might resist
enforcement of a foreign judgment on the grounds that the foreign court
lacked jurisdiction. If the American court refused to recognize the judgment
on these grounds, the reason would be that in recognizing such a judgment it
would violate due process. 1 6 The court need not claim that the due process
clause "applied" directly to the foreign cause of action, tried in a foreign
court against a foreign defendant. It need simply assert that a U.S. court must
extend due process to every individual before it. In this sense, the
applicability of the Constitution is similar to the applicability of local long arm
statutes or choice of law rules. Just as the forum always applies its own rules
of choice of law or personal jurisdiction, so it should apply its own
constitutional rules of personal jurisdiction or choice of law.
3. Does the Constitution Reach Farther Than a Federal Statute?
Perhaps the
above response only serves to raise another problem. Consider the awkward
posture of a foreign defendant protesting the applicability of federal
substantive law. Such a defendant may find it odd to rely upon the United
States Constitution. The objection, after all, is that there is insufficient
contact between his or her activities and the United States for it to be
appropriate to apply American law. Would it not then seem anomalous to
claim protection under due process principles? The defense seems selfcontradictory because it claims both that American law applies and that there
is insufficient connection for American law to apply. Would not the more
logical basis for the defendant's argument be international law, to which the
defendant admits being subject?
This argument is somewhat different than the usual problem about
whether the Constitution applies to activities occurring abroad. In the usual
context, the alien's constitutional argument is not self-contradictory in the
same way. For example, assume that an alien criminal defendant wishes to
protest the introduction into evidence of the results of American surveillance
abroad. This would raise a question about whether the Constitution applies
to searches and seizures taking place outside U.S. territorial boundaries.' '7 In
so claiming protection, the defendant does not undercut his or her own
substantive challenge. The substantive challenge is to the surveillance; he or
she can argue in favor of the applicability of American law without taking a
self-contradictory position.
116. Koster v. Automark Indus., Inc., 640 F.2d 77 (7th Cir. 1981); Corporacion Salvadorena v.
Injection Footwear Corp., 533 F. Supp. 290 (S.D. Fla. 1982); Boivin v. Talcott, 102 F. Supp. 979
(N.D. Ohio 1951).
117. See, e.g., United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974).
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But the defendant who is challenging the extraterritorial application of a
federal statute does risk an apparent self-contradiction. He or she argues that
some American law does apply (the Constitution) and therefore other
American law (the statute) does not apply. This is different from the position
of the criminal defendant, who merely argues that American law does apply,
and therefore surveillance is improper. It is only when the Constitution is
relied upon as the source of a choice of law protection that this difficulty
arises.

While this problem potentially provides a great deal of intellectual
amusement for conflict of laws professors, it cannot be taken seriously. A
court applies its own choice of law rules, so it is to be expected that it would
recognize its own constitutional limitations. Furthermore, if the defendant
risks self-contradiction in opposing the application of an American statute on
the grounds of American law, the plaintiff is equally at risk. How can the
plaintiff argue that the American statute applies, but that the United States
Constitution does not? All in all, the defendant has the far stronger position.
It seems more likely that the Constitution reaches further than a federal
statute than that the federal statute reaches further than the Constitution. If
the plaintiff relies on federal law, there is no good reason not to apply federal
constitutional limitations also.
IV
NEW DIRECTIONS

Each of these arguments-that international conflicts has reached a
methodological dead end and that the Constitution ought to play a more
prominent role-suggests new directions for choice of law. The first is the
basis for analysis in terms of federal common law; the second calls for an
inquiry into what limitations the federal Constitution might create.
A.

Federal Common Law

It is time to recognize that the rules for the applicability of American law
internationally are judicial constructs. Admittedly, judicial preferences are
subordinated to congressional will when a statutory preference can be
discerned. But this does not mean that the answers to all such issues can be
found in the statutes themselves. Statutory construction, under some
circumstances, is a fiction. Judges rely on international law and on their own
views of sound policy when there is no other way to resolve cases. This means
that criticism of existing rules of statutory reach should not be characterized
as disagreement with "congressional will" or even "American interests."
Instead, it may be disagreement over what American interests consist of, and
an attempt to refine what a reasonable Congress would have wanted under
the circumstances. Presumptions of territoriality, respect for traditional
principles of international law, and deference to the interests of other
countries are as appropriate at this stage as at the initial formulation of a
choice of law rule.
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Calling this body of rules and principles "federal common law"
emphasizes two things. First, it is judge-made law; therefore it need not be
permitted to become rigid.
Continued flexibility is legitimate and
appropriate. Second, it is federal, not state, law.
While the latter point may be obvious, it should not be taken for granted.
There are two reasons why such law should be federal. One is that the
substantive law whose reach must be decided is federal law. Courts, both
state and federal, should use federal choice of law rules to decide the scope of
a federal substantive law, just as the federal courts use state choice of law rules
when applying state substantive law. " 8 A second reason is that the issue is
one of international relations, and international law is typically treated as
federal law. Indeed, state law that impacts on international relations has on
numerous occasions been invalidated because in such issues the United States
must "speak with a single voice."' 19 The Supreme Court has recently hinted
that "foreign relations policies" might bear on assertions of state court
jurisdiction, which supports the analogous argument that there are foreign
relations limits on state choice of law. 120 This rationale is rather different
from the one based upon the federal nature of the cause of action. Not only is
it theoretically different, it may give different results in certain fact patterns.
In particular, the "international relations" rationale might also apply when a
state law competed with the law of a foreign nation. As discussed earlier, such
conflicts have to this point been dealt with according to state choice of law

rules. 121
It is not at all clear that conflicts between state law and the law of a foreign
nation ought to be dealt with solely as a matter of state law. True, to this date
the major sources of friction with foreign countries have involved applications
of federal law and not state law. State causes of action have as great a
potential for friction as federal ones, however, and this potential has begun to
materialize.
The Bhopal litigation, for example, demonstrates the
international ramifications of state law litigation. The question of what law
ought to be applied, instead of whether the case ought to be heard in an
American court at all, potentially provokes as much controversy as any
conflict between federal law and the law of another nation. In addition, the
federal discovery rules that foreign nations have found so irksome are equally
likely to cause problems where a state provides the substantive law.
The likely increasing numbers of state law cases (particularly products
liability cases) with substantial foreign policy overtones militates against
leaving issues of adjudicative and legislative jurisdiction entirely to the states.
It is not simply that states may be inclined to overreach; constitutional
limitations might be adequate to control that problem. Rather, there are
118.
119.
(1968);
120.
121.

KlaxonCo. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg., 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
Japan Line, Ltd. v. Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434 (1979); Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429
Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Ct., 55 U.S.L.W. 4197, 4200 (1987).
See supra text accompanying notes 6, 14.
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tremendous difficulties inherent in subjecting foreign defendants to the
jurisdictional rules of fifty different sovereigns. As this dilemma comes to be
more widely appreciated, political pressure may mount either for treaties that
would preempt state law on such issues or, failing that, for the application of
federal jurisdictional standards in state substantive law litigation.
B.

The Role of the Constitution

This article is not an appropriate place for an exhaustive analysis of the
possible contours of the constitutional limits on the application of federal law
to transnational disputes. That would be an article, or more likely several, in
and of itself. Nevertheless, a few observations may be of interest.
There are two different ways in which the application of federal law to a
transnational dispute might run afoul of the Constitution. First, there may
not be an affirmative basis in the Constitution for regulation of the particular
issue in question. Federal power consists of certain enumerated functions,
including, for example, the regulation of international commerce. 12 2 Second,
while there may be a basis for regulation, imposing the regulation would
violate the defendant's individual rights. In particular, imposition of federal
law without a sufficient nexus for regulation might violate the fifth
amendment's due process guarantee.
These are not merely two different ways of saying the same thing. To
appreciate this point, contrast the limits on state law with the limits on federal
law. The limits on the application of state law are all of the second type:
Because states have residual power, it is unnecessary for them to find an
affirmative basis for their actions. The federal government, to the contrary,
must find a basis for its acts in an enumerated power. Unless a state law
contradicts one of the enumerated limits imposed by the Constitution or is
preempted by a valid federal law, the state law is valid regardless of whether
the state has cited any affirmative basis for legislating.
Restrictions imposed on the federal government under this reasoning do
not seem very burdensome. Under commerce clause analysis in a domestic
context, the powers of Congress are exceedingly broad.' 2 3 Under commerce
clause analysis in an international context, they presumably are equally broad.
But it still must be internationalcommerce. Thus, if a transaction were purely
internal to a single foreign nation, it might be argued that Congress possessed
no affirmative power to legislate. One suspects that this line of reasoning,
while interesting in theory, is likely to result in the invalidation of very few
laws because the scope of congressional power is potentially so broad.
Of greater practical importance would be the other type of limitation.
Even where Congress has some basis for regulation, application of its laws
may still violate due process. One reason would be the lack of a sufficient
nexus between the controversy and the United States. This problem is
122.
123.

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, c. 3.
See generally L. TRIBE, supra note 114, §§ 5-4 to 5-6.
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comparable to the usual due process limits on a state applying its law to a
transnational case. 124 The same test applicable to state choice of law under
the due process clause might be used here: "[A] significant aggregation of
contacts, creating interests." 1 25 Another reason might be the imposition of
inconsistent obligations. It can be argued that a violation of due process
occurs when a U.S. court orders a defendant to engage in actions that would
result in criminal or civil sanctions in another state. Discovery rules provide
the most frequent example of this problem, although there are other
12 6
examples such as the imposition of export restrictions.
V
CONCLUSION

It is entirely possible that none of these subtleties will ever prove
necessary to explore. So far, the courts have proceeded quite happily while
remaining oblivious to these issues. Accordingly, counsel for foreign
defendants have focused attention on issues of proven importance. Even law
professors have done well enough without these added complications.
If one stops to think about these rarified theoretical observations,
however, one might come to wonder about some things that are otherwise
taken for granted. The methodological status of choice of law rules ultimately
makes a difference, because it influences a court's view of its proper role in the
international arena. The choice between state and federal law to resolve these
issues likewise poses a theoretical issue with practical dimensions; this choice
dictates whether a state court deciding the applicability of state law must
follow federal precedents on the applicability of federal law, and vice versa.
The constitutional issues are of comparable importance in that they could
pose outer limits on Congress' power.
If these questions do provoke interest and gain the attention of courts and
litigators, then perhaps we will get some answers to them in the coming years.
Certainly, it should be expected at least that cases involving private
international law will continue to be a source of controversy and scholarly
analysis, however the issues are phrased.

124.
125.
126.

See, e.g., Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930).
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 308, 313 (1981) (plurality opinion).
See, e.g., Dresser Indus., Inc. v. Baldridge, 549 F. Supp. 108 (D.D.C. 1982).

